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Résumé
Les relations entre les évolutions des prix, l'expiration des brevets et la concurrence varient considérablement, selon les pays.
Une distinction nette apparaît. Dans les pays (États-Unis en particulier), dans lesquels domine la concurrence de marché, une
distinction claire s'impose entre les firmes innovatrices et les firmes qui imitent après l'expiration des brevets. Les produits
originaux bénéficient de primes importantes jusqu'à l'expiration des brevets, qui enclenche une concurrence féroce. Dans les
pays à prix administrés (en particulier la France et l'Italie), le système encourage des stratégies de prolifération des marques et
de différenciation horizontale, par voie d'imitation bien avant l'expiration des brevets. Ces systèmes à prix administrés ont
tendance à étouffer la concurrence par les prix, à protéger les entreprises moins efficientes et à encourager des stratégies
d'innovation incrémentales, par imitation.
Abstract
This paper shows that the relationships between the dynamics of drug priees, patent expiry, and competition by multisource
drugs vary significantly across countries. A clear distinction seems to emerge. On the one side, systems that rely on market
based competition (particularly the US) promote a clear distinction between firms that act as innovators and firms that act as
imitators after patent expiry. Original products enjoy premium prices under patent protection, and face fierce price competition
after patent expiry. On the contrary, systems that rely on administered prices (particularly France and Italy) nurture strategies of
pre-emptive brand proliferation and horizontal differentiation by imitative brand name products, well before patent expiry. Our
work confirms that that systems that rely on administered prices have tended to stifle price competition, to protect less efficient
companies, and to encourage strategies of incremental innovation and imitation.
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I. - INTRODUCTION 
This paper constitutes an attempt at investigating processes of dynamic comp
etition in pharmaceuticals, with reference to the nature and intensity of price 
competition in relation to patent expiry. 
We focus on what happens to drug prices and to the diffusion of multi-source 
products both before and after patent expiry, in relation to different regulatory 
regimes (Jacobzone, 2000; Gambardella, Orsenigo, and Pammolli, 2000) (1). 
The market for pharmaceutical products is characterized by the co-existence 
of most of the textbook motivations of market failures. 
(*) Corresponding Author: DSA, Faculty of Economics, Via Montebello, 7, Florence, 50123, 
Italy ; email : pammolli@cln.it. This research was supported by a grant from the Merck 
Foundation (EPRIS Project), and by the European Commission (Contract # SOE1-CT 98- 
11 16, DG 12-SOLS: ESSY Project). 
(1) Voir note page suivante. 
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A cornerstone of the debate is clearly patent protection. While patents are 
usually recognized as being a fundamental incentive to innovation in phar- 
maceuticals, for a long time in many countries - including Germany (until 
1968), Sweden (until 1978), Switzerland (until 1977) besides the usual 
examples of Italy and Japan - only process patents have been granted. In 
more recent years, the attitude towards a stronger IPR regime has been sprea
ding. Currently, the debate on patents is re-emerging, especially as it 
concerns the role of patents in promoting innovation and economic develop
ment, the scope of patents granted in genetics, and on discoveries derived by 
publicly funded research. 
Another crucial aspect concerns price regulation. There are in principle 
many rationales for price controls in Pharmaceuticals, in relation to informat
ion asymmetries and low demand price elasticity. However, it is often argued 
that price regulation is unnecessary and harmful. On the one side, the industry 
is characterized by intense dynamic competition also within specific sub-mark
ets. On the other side, it is maintained that price regulation distorts the price 
mechanisms, curbs the profits of companies and the incentives to innovation, 
allows the survival of less efficient firms and, in general, creates environments 
where competition is too lenient. Moreover, price controls per se do not redu
ce health expenditures, while they tend to diminish incentives for prices to act 
as signals of relative quality. 
The debate is inherently complex, and the matter is further complicated by the 
fact that regulation takes very different forms, across countries and over time. 
In recent years one observed a tendency towards the use of less invasive 
regulation and a higher reliance on market-based measures aiming at promot
ing price elasticity and competition on the final market. 
Prominent among these measures is linked to generic competition, as an in
strument for reducing prices and countervailing exclusivity power granted by 
patents (2). 
(1) Even within Europe, healthcare and pharmaceutical systems are hugely diversified in 
terms of the way they are organized and financed, ranging from national health schemes 
funded out of general taxes (the UK-Italy-Spain model), to mandated social insurance 
with pluralist providers (the Germany-France-Netherlands model). The main goal of the 
paper is to provide a set of comparative empirical evidences showing how major institu
tional differences affect patterns of industrial competitions in five major developed count
ries (USA, UK, Germany, France, and Italy). These countries differ significantly - among 
other important factors like medical traditions, size of the market, provision and financing 
of health care, extent of public and insurance coverage for pharmaceutical consumption, 
etc. - in terms of the extent and regimes of regulation, particularly as prices are concer
ned. 
(2) This was actually the intention of the Waxman - Hatch Act in the US in 1984. 
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How these mechanisms work in practice is however less than perfectly clear 
and despite some important previous works, we know still very little on the 
subject (see Mossialos, 1997; NERA, 1998; Jacobzone, 2000 ; López- 
Casanovas and Jönsson, 2001). We shall discuss the relevant literature in 
Section 2. For the time being, suffice it to mention that it is often argued that 
price controls discourage competition by generics and greatly reduce their 
competitive effect on drug prices. 
We focus on how drug prices change over time, before and after patent 
expiry and, possibly, as a consequence of generic competition. Our results 
suggest that the relationships between the dynamics of drag prices, patent 
expiry, and generic competition are complex and differentiated across count
ries. 
A long list of caveats is necessary at this stage. First, note that we do no look 
at comparisons of price levels across countries, but at price changes within 
countries (see Berndt, 2000; Danzón and Chow 2000). 
Second, we do not analyze the determinants of generic competition (see 
NERA, 1998). Price levels, price changes, generic competition are likely to be 
endogenously co-determined. In this paper, we confine ourselves to a prelimi
nary analysis, considering the role of some fundamental properties of the mark
ets, like their relative size and growth, price differentials between original 
and generic products, but falling short of providing a fully-fledged (let alone a 
simultaneous model) of generic competition and prices. 
Third, we do not examine how price dynamics and generic competition 
affect innovation, nor how price levels and their changes affect welfare (see 
Comanor, 1986; Grabowski, Vernon, 1992; Scherer, 1993). 
Finally, we do not directly relate the observed dynamics to specific features 
of the regimes of regulation across countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly discuss the recent 
relevant literature on these subjects. In Section 3, we describe the data 
base. Section 4 provides some descriptive evidence on the dynamics of the 
prices of different types of drugs (original, licensed, other branded and 
unbranded products), on the diffusion of generics and on market concent
ration. In Section 5, we perform some preliminary multivariate analysis 
to dig further into these issues. We look at the determinants of price dyna
mics focusing on the impact of patent expiry and competition by multi- 
source drugs. Next, we examine some of the relationships between the pat
tern of diffusion of generics, price differentials between original and gener
ic products, size and rate of growth of markets. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
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IL - AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT ISSUES 
Previous literature has examined the factors influencing the diffusion of gene- 
rics and their impact on drug prices. Most of these studies have focused on the 
US market and have not considered directly the role of patent expiry (3). 
More recent studies have addressed the issue looking also at other countries 
and have suggested that both generic penetration and the impact on prices is 
linked to the extent of price regulation (see Danzón and Chow, 2000). 
In particular, Hudson (2000) examines directly the relationship between 
patent expiry and the diffusion of generics. He shows that both generic entry 
and the lag between patent expiry and generic entry are linked to the size of 
the market at the time of patent expiry. Second, the speed at which the origi
nal brand loses revenue is proportional to both the size of the market and the 
price of the original brand prior to generic entry. In the US the impact of gener
ic entry on original brand sales is found to be much bigger as compared to the 
United Kingdom, Japan and Germany. This result might reflect the larger size 
of the US market, but also different regulatory environments that putting little 
pressure on patients, doctors and pharmacists not to request expensive branded 
products and keeping relatively low prices of branded drugs actually make 
generic entry less attractive and reduce its overall impact on prices. Hudson 
makes the additional point that more successful drugs attract - others things 
being equal - generic competition and thus tend to lose sales after patent expir
y. Conversely, less successful drugs will suffer less from generic competition. 
Thus, the value of patents for a company has to be computed taking into 
account not only the period of patent protection, but also to the period after 
patent expiry. Since patent expiry does not always induce the entry of generics 
and, in any case, there is a lag of sometimes several years between patent expi
ry and generic entry, the firm' revenues will not disappear immediately but 
will be eroded over a period of time. In other words, the value of patents 
extends after patent expiry. 
These results suggest that generic competition has lower effects on prices in 
tightly regulated countries for different reasons. First, regulation - almost by 
(3) Hurwitz and Caves (1988) found that original brand market share is directly proportional 
to the age of the original brand and to own brand promotional spending, while it is negat
ively correlated to entrants' potential spending and to the number of entrants. This latter 
variable was found to be proportional to the total size of the market and to the age of the 
original brand. Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Suh (1993) showed that in the US gener
ics entered the market at a significant price discount, which then declines over time. The 
price of the original brand actually increased - in nominal terms - after the entry of gener
ics. In a more recent study, Grabowski and Vernon (1996) found that generic competition 
has been intensifying in the US, with major brand names typically losing half of their mar
ket share within a year of patent expiry. Similarly, Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) 
found that the price of the original brand declines over time as more generic entrants 
appear. 
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definition - keeps the prices of branded patented drugs lower. This reduces the 
attraction of generic entry. Second, generic competition is further reduced 
because patients, doctors and physicians have less incentives to substitute low 
priced drugs (generics) to original branded products. Thus, demand elasticity 
tends to be lower. Third, producers try to exploit the regulatory regimes by co- 
marketing generics with generic suppliers or producing minor new products 
and negotiating comparatively higher prices. 
Conversely, in less regulated regimes, innovators of high quality drugs enjoy 
higher prices. This attracts the entry of generics. The original brand producer 
may try to differentiate its product vis-à-vis generics, e.g. through advertising, 
and operate market segmentation. In this case, pre-entry prices of pioneer 
brands can be maintained or, in some cases, extended, upon patent expiry 
because of strong brand loyalty toward original brands (Caves, Whinston, 
Hurwitz, 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). Alternatively, pioneer off- 
patent products become OTCs (e.g., Pepcid, Zantac, Tagamet) and are paid for 
out-of pocket. Competition by generics becomes substantial very soon, prices 
fall and market shares of the branded drug are eroded. In practice, in these 
countries, markets generate a sharp distinction between innovators and imita
tors (producers of generics). 
III. - DATA 
Data for this paper are drawn by the MIDAS - IMS International database 
that provides quarterly data on the sales of pharmaceutical products for the 
time period July 1987 - December 1998 for five countries : the US, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. 
For each product, we aggregate the information across different forms and 
dosages. 
Sales are expressed as quantities (SU: number of Standard Units (4)) and in 
US dollars. The values in US dollars have been calculated using the US 
Exchange rate for the latest available time period. This measure is indicated as 
LCD, Local Currency Dollar. Sales have been deflated using the Consumer 
Price Index (OECD data), 1998. 
Products in our sample cover 103 molecules with known date of patent expi
ry for 1986-1996 (see Table 1). 
We use quarterly data on the average number of Defined Daily Doses (DDD) 
in SU. 
(4) Standard Units (SU) make possible to compare solid and liquid products. In the case of 
solid products, the SU is a capsule or a tablet. For liquid products, a spoonful (5 ml). 
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Table 1 - Number of molecules in the sample 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Number 
54 
70 
68 
77 
15 
The database doesn't provide information on DDDs for three active ingre
dients in Germany, one in the US and in the UK. We work therefore on a 
sample of 284 active ingredients. Only for 137 of them, entry of multi-source 
drugs has taken place. 
For each package, we do know : 
• Date of patent expiry (month and year) ; 
• Manufacturer ; 
• Corporation owning the patent ; 
• Role in the market: Originator, Licensed, Other Brand or Unbranded. 
The descriptive analysis has been performed aggregating the data on a year
ly basis from 1988 to 1998. 
As for quantities, we consider the number of DDDs, obtained by computing, 
for each package, the ratio of sales (in SU) to the average daily dose (5) (in 
SU) (6). The price per DDD has been obtained as the ratio of the value of sales 
(LCD) to the value in terms of DDD (nDDD). 
IV. - THE DYNAMICS OF PRICE INDEXES 
IV. 1. The Dynamics of the Prices of Original and Licensed Products and 
Average Prices 
First, we look at the dynamics of price indexes, before and after patent expir
y. For Original and Licensed products, the index is computed from the avera
ge (weighted with quantities sold) of the price indexes of all the products 
included in the sample. The prices indexes are computed as the ratio of the 
market price at time t and the price at the time of patent expiry. 
(5) Averages of daily doses over a five year period. 
(6) Data are independent of both dosage and the pharmaceutical form. Thus, it is then pos
sible to aggregate, for each product, the values referring to different forms and dosages. 
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Table 2 - Price Indexes for Original Products (LCD Weighted Average), 
Pre and Post Entry Periods 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
-4 
0.86 
1.24 
1.27 
1.51 
1.37 
-3 
0.90 
1.23 
1.19 
1.27 
1.26 
-2 
0.95 
1.12 
1.09 
1.05 
1.16 
-1 
0.97 
1.07 
1.06 
1.01 
1.04 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1 
1.02 
0.95 
0.95 
1.00 
0.98 
2 
1.05 
0.92 
0.92 
0.99 
1.00 
3 
1.07 
0.90 
0.89 
1.00 
0.96 
4 
1.05 
0.85 
0.85 
1.01 
0.92 
Table 3 - Price Indexes for Licensed Products (LCD Weighted Average), 
Pre and Post Entry Periods 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
-4 
0.92 
1.27 
1.29 
4.16 
1.42 
-3 
0.91 
1.22 
1.23 
2.62 
1.23 
-2 
0.93 
1.26 
1.13 
1.89 
1.14 
-1 
0.96 
1.20 
1.11 
1.03 
1.01 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1 
1.04 
0.88 
0.95 
1.01 
0.96 
2 
1.05 
0.83 
0.92 
1.00 
0.96 
3 
1.03 
0.79 
0.93 
1.02 
0.95 
4 
1.02 
0.78 
0.94 
1.02 
0.97 
Tables 2 and 3 show a very similar pattern for Original and Licensed pro
ducts. In both cases in the US the prices grow (substantially in the case of 
Original products) in a period spanning four years before and after (two years 
for Licensed products) patent expiry (from 0.86 to 1.05). The European count
ries are characterized instead by a rather different dynamics. Prices decline 
continuously over time approaching patent expiry. Afterwards, prices continue 
to fall in Germany and in the UK. They remain stable in France and in Italy 
(until the third year after patent expiry). Over the whole period considered, the 
reduction of the prices of Original products is particularly strong in France and 
is quite similar in the other countries. 
This result is consistent with the observation that prices tend to fall with age 
in Europe and especially in regulated countries, where prices are set at time of 
the launch of the drug and then they are seldom allowed to be increased. As a 
consequence, their real price tends to fall over time. Conversely, US producers 
seem to practice some form of penetration pricing. After patent expiry, moreov
er, they are able to segment the market and charge premium prices on bran
ded drugs. 
Let us examine now the dynamics of average prices (Table 4). In the US, the 
average price increases before patent expiry and, after that date, it remains 
stable. Considering that - as just noted - the price of Original and Licensed 
products continuously increases, this result presumably reflects the entry of 
multi-source drugs that are sold, on average, at a lower price. On the whole, 
however, average prices do not decline after patent expiry and, if anything, 
they increase as compared to the initial period. Interestingly enough, this dyna
mics suggests that price increases before patent expiry can be used as a entry- 
defending strategy by the pioneer firm, softening price competition with gene- 
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rie drugs and, possibly, enhancing the demand of branded products. As for 
European countries, not only average prices decrease steadily over time, but 
their dynamics is practically identical to the dynamics of Original and 
Licensed products. In particular, in France, average prices fall sharply before 
the patent expires and then remain constant : that is to say, either the competit
ion of generics does not affect the dynamic of prices or the price of generics 
move precisely like the price of original and licensed drugs. 
Table 4 - Price Indexes for All Products (LCD Weighted Average), 
Pre and Post Entry Periods 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
-4 
0.87 
1.24 
1.27 
2.04 
1.37 
-3 
0.90 
1.23 
1.19 
1.64 
1.23 
-2 
0.95 
1.15 
1.09 
1.27 
1.15 
-1 
0.99 
1.09 
1.07 
1.02 
1.03 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1 
1.00 
0.93 
0.94 
1.00 
0.97 
2 
1.00 
0.89 
0.91 
0.99 
0.98 
3 
1.01 
0.85 
0.89 
1.00 
0.95 
4 
1.01 
0.80 
0.86 
1.01 
0.95 
IV.2.The Dynamics of the Prices of Multi-Source Products 
In this section we compare the price indexes of the different types of pro
ducts to the price of the Original drugs. Here, we distinguish - within multi- 
source drugs - between branded (Other Brand) and unbranded generics 
(Unbranded). We computed take as a basis the average price of the Original 
products corresponding to the multi-source drugs considered first at the time 
of patent expiry (Figure 1). Thus, figure 1 illustrates how the prices of the 
other types of products change over time relative to the average price of origi
nal products at the moment at which the patent expires (t = 0). 
The box plots used in Figure 1 represent the distribution of price indexes (on a 
quarterly base) from the date of patent expiry to 24 quarters (6 years) after that 
date. Each vertical rectangle gives information on the distribution of the price 
indexes for each specific category of products (Original, Licensed, Other Brand e 
Unbranded) in each period. Through the box plots, we obtain a visual representa
tion of the dynamics and of the variability of the price indexes in each period (7). 
(7) Consider a single box. The bold line running through the rectangle is the median of the 
distribution. Thus, 50% of the observations are above the bold line and the other 50% are 
below it. The colored rectangle represents the interquartile deviation, that is to say the dif
ference between the third and the first quartile. Therefore, it contains 50% of the obser
vations. The lines above and below the rectangle are extended until the maximum and 
minimum values of the distribution (without considering outliers).The circles outside the 
distribution are in fact those cases with values between 1.5 and 3 times the box length 
from the upper or the lower edge of the box that are distant from the extreme of the rec
tangle more than three times its length. In order to make the box plots easier to read, we 
don't show the outliers, i.e. those cases with values larger than three times the box length 
form the upper or the lower edge of the box. 
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Figure 1: Price Indexes for Pre and Post Entry Periods, 
Different Types of Products (I) 
USA: price indices 
based on Original price at time 0 
UK: price indices 
based on Original price at time 0 
Original Licensed Ott« 
Germany: price indices 
base on Original price at time 0 
Original Licensed Other ! 
France: price indices 
based on Original price at time 0 
Licensed Other Brand Unbranded Licensed Other Brand 
Italy: price indices 
based on Original price at time 0 
Figure 1 shows that in all countries except Germany (and the case of Other 
Brands in the US) the median of these indexes falls over time. Moreover, the 
box plots show that unbranded products seem to introduce some price compet
ition in the US and the UK, while they do not have a significant impact on 
price levels in France and in Italy. 
IV.3. Patterns of Entry of Multi-source Drugs 
Table 5 shows the aggregate market shares of the weighted averages of sales and 
quantities sold before and after patent expiry of Original and Licensed products. 
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Figure 2: Market Shares for Pre and Post Entry Periods, 
Different Types of Products (I) 
USA -nDDD Share 
100% 
-6-4-2 0 2 4 
Í g Original > Licensed o Other Brand pUnbranded I 
Germany - nDDD Share 
-6-4-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
¡Original ■ Licensed □ Other Brand rjUnbranded 
Italy - nDDD Share 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
I Original ■ Licensed a Other Brand aUnbranded 
UK - nDDD Share 
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
1 Original h Licensed □ Other Brand rjUnbranded 
France - nDDD Share 
-6-4-2 0 8 10 12 
I Original p Licensed q Other Brand QUnbranded 
All the Sample - nDDD Share 
100% 
-6-4-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
Table 5 - Market shares for Original and Licensed products (LCD weighted average) 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
LCD 
nDDD 
LCD 
nDDD 
LCD 
nDDD 
LCD 
nDDD 
LCD 
nDDD 
-4 
99.99 
100 
100 
100 
99.81 
99.81 
99.98 
99.97 
89.84 
87.75 
-3 
100 
100 
97.42 
97.31 
99.72 
99.65 
100 
100 
86.65 
86.02 
-2 
100 
100 
89.71 
89.34 
99.89 
99.86 
100 
99.99 
86.63 
86.41 
-1 
98.39 
97.71 
91.27 
90.62 
99.32 
99.22 
99.72 
99.72 
86.65 
89.15 
0 
97.39 
95.32 
92.18 
91.09 
96.00 
91.14 
99.84 
99.86 
88.52 
91.49 
1 
95.00 
92.50 
92.14 
90.48 
91.17 
86.10 
99.83 
99.85 
90.23 
92.78 
2 
92.29 
88.23 
91.96 
89.75 
89.95 
85.55 
99.43 
99.35 
88.97 
92.47 
3 
91.84 
86.69 
92.25 
89.03 
88.62 
84.31 
98.98 
98.71 
91.04 
92.95 
4 
91.41 
86.07 
91.65 
87.50 
89.33 
87.53 
98.76 
98.47 
92.65 
93.75 
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In all countries the Original and Licensed products control on average more 
than 95% of the market at the date of patent expiry, both in terms of sales and 
in terms of quantities sold (number of sold DDDs), except Italy and the UK 
where this share is somewhat lower. 
After four years, the market share of generics is quite similar across count
ries, with the notable exception of France, where there is practically no entry 
of multi-source products. In the US, Germany and UK, the erosion of the mar
ket share of Original and Licensed products is larger in terms of quantities than 
in terms of sales because the prices of multi-source drugs are lower in these 
countries than the average prices charged by the patent holders. 
In the longer run, a clear distinction can be detected between Other Brand e 
Unbranded multi- source drugs (Figures 3 and 4). After around a decade after 
Figure 3: Market Shares for Pre and Post Entry Periods, 
Different Types of Products (II) 
USA -LCD Share 
100% 
20% 
0% 
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
lOriginal a Licensed g Other Brand gUnbranded| 
Germany - LCD Share 
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
■ Original ■ Licensed □ Other Brand □ Unbranded 
Italy -LCD Share 
-6-4-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
I Origínala Licensed a Other Brand rj Unbranded 
UK - LCD Share 
-6 -4 -2 8 10 12 
I Original ■ Licensed rj Other Brand g Unbranded 
France - LCD Share 
100% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
-6-4-2 0 8 10 12 
■ Original g Licensed p Other Brand g Unbranded 
All the Sample - LCD Share 
100% 
0% 
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
■Original n Licensed rj Other Brand g Unbranded 
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Figure 4: Average Number of Products per Molecule for Pre and Post Entry 
Periods, Different Types of Products (II) 
USA UK 
Germany France 
Italy 
XXX 
patent expiry, the penetration of generics is quite strong in the US and in 
Germany, less so in the UK and especially in France and in Italy where, as 
noted earlier, there is practically no entry. In terms of sales, the entry of the 
Unbranded is larger in the US and in the UK, whereas in Germany one 
observes a significant entry of the Other Brand products. In Italy, Other Brand 
products enter the market before patent expiry and their share remains basi
cally constant over time. 
To make a long story short, we consider the existence of detectable corre
spondences between specific patterns of competition in the final market and 
specific regulatory measures/frameworks. As an example, in the UK, it is 
clearly detectable the role of generic prescribing practices that facilitates tran
sition from original to generic products as patents expire. 
Another relevant factor in explaining the existence of differences in patterns 
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of industrial competition among countries is transition to OTC. In the US, and 
largely in the UK, OTC products are not reimbursed. On the contrary, in 
France and Spain they might be available OTC, but are still reimbursed if pres
cribed. 
A further indicator of the extent of penetration of multi-source drugs is the 
ratio between the number of products (in each category) and the number of 
molecules that are present in the market. Figure 5 shows the dynamics of these 
ratios before and after patent expires. 
The story that emerges from the observation of these indicators confirms 
once again the previous findings. In the US, the ratio relative to Licensed pro
ducts grows slightly, while the Original products fluctuate over time. Other 
Brand and Unbranded products are practically non-existent before patent 
expiry. Afterwards they grow rapidly in the following decade and then the ratio 
starts to decline. 
In France, the ratio for the Original products grows continuously. Other 
Brand and Unbranded products increase very slowly until six years after 
patent expiry and then grow rapidly for around three years, although the value 
of the ratios remains quite small and starts to decline again. 
V. - TOWARDS AN INTERPRETATION : MULTIVARIATE 
ANALYSIS 
In this section, we perform some simple multivariate analysis in order to 
investigate some of the factors that might influence the dynamics of prices, 
market shares and the number of producers of multi-source products. 
The literature discussed in Section 2 suggested first that the dynamics of drug 
prices actually follows quite different patterns across countries, partly as a conse
quence of the regulation mechanisms. In particular, in strictly regulated markets, 
nominal prices of original and licensed products remain fixed and are not all
owed to vary as time goes by. Real prices would then tend to fall over time, pure
ly as a consequence of a time trend (or of the age of the molecule). 
Second, lower prices, coupled with little incentives for doctors, pharmacists and 
patients to prescribe and use cheaper generics, do not attract the entry of multi- 
source drugs and reduce competition among them. On the contrary, in these count
ries multi-source suppliers are usually licensed co-marketers rather than compet
ing generic manufacturers or minor new products that enter to obtain a higher 
regulated price. Conversely, in less regulated regimes, since innovators of high 
quality drugs enjoy higher prices, entry by generics is stimulated. The original 
brand producers, however, differentiate their products and are able to increase the 
prices of branded drugs even after patent expiry. However, as times goes by and 
the competition by generics becomes substantial and the market shares of the bran
ded drug is eroded, prices will start to decline. 
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Third, generic entry is linked to the size of the market at the time of patent 
expiry and - relatedly - the speed at which the original brand loses revenue is 
proportional to both the size of the market and the price of the original brand 
prior to generic entry. 
The descriptive evidence so far does confirm some of these results, but it 
raises questions on other aspects. The diverging dynamics of the prices of ori
ginal and licensed products across countries is largely confirmed by our data. 
Similarly, the stronger penetration of multi- source drugs in the US and the low 
diffusion of generics in tightly regulated countries like France and Italy is also 
confirmed. 
However, our descriptive analysis tells little about the determinants of price 
dynamics, especially as patent expiry and generic competition are concerned. 
Similarly, it is worth asking what drives generic entry and diffusion in diffe
rent countries. 
The following, simple, multivariate analysis is just meant to start to shed 
some light on some of these problems. 
Our panel refers to quarterly data over the period July 1987 - December 
1998. It considers both molecules and products, the number of which (after 
eliminating a few outliers from our original sample) is reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 - Number of molecules and products by country 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Total 
Number of Molecules 
52 
66 
62 
75 
15 
270 
Number of products 
182 
256 
686 
243 
93 
1460 
The data have been organized around the date of patent expiry. In other 
words, for each product time zero is the date of patent expiry. The period 
immediately preceding this date is indexed as t-1, the period just after this date 
is indexed as t+1, etc. Clearly, in the panel different products are present for 
periods of different length. Given, our procedure for organizing the data, 
however, we simply treat our data as an unbalanced panel. 
We estimate both the fixed effects and the random effects specifications, and 
then discriminate between the two using the Hausman Test. 
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V.l. Determinants of the Dynamics of the Prices of Original 
and Multi-Source Drugs 
We begin by looking at the dynamics of the prices of Original products befo
re and after patent expiry and in particular if it is influenced by patent expiry 
and/or by the entry of multi-source drugs. 
The dependent variable is the average price of Original products, with the 
following independent variables (see also Suh, 1993) : 
• TIME: time (quarters) before and after patent expiry. Thus the variable 
takes values equal to -1, -2, etc. before patent expiry and 1, 2, etc. after that 
date. 
• PE: dummy variable indicating patent expiry. This variable takes a value 
equal to zero before patent expiry and a value equal to one afterwards. 
• GEN: dummy variable indicating the presence of multi-source drugs, i.e 
the variable takes a value equal to one when there are positive sales of multi- 
source drugs. 
• HHI, the Herfindahl index of market concentration, calculated at the level 
of each molecule, obtained as the sum of the squared market shares of each 
manufacturer operating on the market defined by the molecule under study. 
Table 7 reports the results of our analysis. 
The variable TIME has always significant coefficients. It is positive in the 
case of the US and negative in the other countries. This result confirms the des
criptive evidence discussed earlier as well as the previous analyses : the ave
rage price of Original products increases over time in the US and decreases in 
the other countries. 
The dummy variable for patent expiry is significant only in Germany, with 
a negative sign, and in Italy, with a positive sign. Thus, only in Germany patent 
expiry is directly correlated with a reduction of the price of original drugs. 
Conversely, in Italy, the prices of original products actually increase after 
patent expiry. However, patent expiry induces significant modifications in 
price dynamics over time in the US, France and Italy, as shown by the inter
action between the variable TIME and the variable PE. In the US, this variable 
has a negative sign: after the date of expiry prices increase more slowly. In 
France and Italy, the sign is positive: after patent expiry, the tendency towards 
price reduction in each following quarter becomes weaker. The interaction 
variable is non significant in Germany (where however the dummy for patent 
expiry, PE, is significant) and in the UK: here patent expiry does not have any 
independent or additional impact on the tendency towards price decline over 
time. Thus, rather than being a discrete shock on (competition and) prices, the 
expiration of patents tends to induce changes in price dynamics. This result 
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Table 7 - 
HHI 
TIME 
PE 
GEN 
TIME x GEN 
TIME x PE 
PE x GEN 
Constant 
Hausmann Test 
R2 or s2 
s2 or s2a 
n. observations 
n. molecules 
Dependent Variable : Average price of Original products 
USA 
-0.1292 
(0.0812) 
0.0226** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0085 
(0.0359) 
-0.3501** 
(0.0686) 
-0.0071** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0117** 
(0.0027) 
0.3794** 
(0.0745) 
15.6244* 
0.9373 
0.25892 
1255 
33 
UK 
0.3831** 
(0.0690) 
-0.0119** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0247 
(0.0212) 
-0.0622 
(0.0323) 
0.0082** 
(0.0012) 
-0.000023 
(0.0014) 
-0.0156 
(0.0360) 
0.7197** 
(0.1464) 
0.0001 
0.20392 
0.96292 
1925 
49 
Germany 
0.3865** 
(0.0689) 
-0.0057** 
(0.0021) 
-0.1593** 
(0.0323) 
-0.1000 
(0.0678) 
-0.0005 
(0.0016) 
-0.0010 
(0.0023) 
0.1102 
(0.0757) 
0.9918** 
(0.1450) 
9.4439 
0.3 1092 
0.98 182 
1999 
47 
France 
-0.0252 
(0.0316) 
-0.0053** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0063 
(0.0062) 
0.1737** 
(0.0162) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0004) 
0.0046** 
(0.0004) 
-0.1477** 
(0.0189) 
0.6755** 
(0.0944) 
0.0001 
0.07562 
0.73222 
2489 
57 
Italy 
-0.2605* 
(0.1130) 
-0.0110** 
(0.0016) 
0.0761* 
(0.0351) 
0.1863** 
(0.0417) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0013) 
0.0131** 
(0.0019) 
-0.2166** 
(0.0421) 
0.6850** 
(0.1506) 
12.9381 
0.13472 
0.88452 
542 
13 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
supports the conclusion by Hudson that effective patent life extends beyond 
the date of expiration. 
The presence of multi-source drugs is significant in the US, with a negative 
sign, as well as in France and Italy, with a positive sign: multi-source products 
tend to reduce the price of original drugs in the US, while they have the oppos
ite effect in France and Italy, consistently with the descriptive analysis. 
Moreover, multi-source drugs have an effect on the time profile of prices. 
Their presence tends to reduce price changes over time in the US (the price 
increase of originals over time is slowed down by the competition of generics), 
France and Italy (the decline of the prices of originals over time is magnified 
by generics). In the UK, prices decline over time at a slower rate if there is 
generic competition, possibly reflecting the existence of significant differences 
at the level of relevant sub markets (see also Jonsson and Ekelund, 2001). The 
interaction between patent expiry and the presence of generics is significant in 
the US (with a positive sign), in France and Italy (with a negative sign). 
Finally, market concentration has a significant coefficient in the UK and 
Germany, with a positive sign, and in Italy, but with a negative sign. 
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Let us look now at the dynamics of the average prices of multi-source drugs 
(Table 8). In all countries except Italy prices tend to decline over time. The 
coefficient of the variable measuring market concentration is significant and 
positive in the US and France. That is to say, prices of generics are higher in 
more concentrated markets. The coefficient of the variable HHI is insignificant 
in the UK and Germany and once again negative in Italy : here the prices of 
generics are lower in highly concentrated markets. 
Table 8 - Dependent Variable: Average price of multi-source drugs 
HHI 
TIMEA 
Constant 
Hausmann Test 
R2 or s2 
s2 or s^ 
n. observations 
n. molecules 
USA 
0.3716** 
(0.1007) 
-0.0171** 
(0.0011) 
15.843* 
0.6877 
0.26082 
821 
34 
UK 
0.0682 
(0.0536) 
-0.0066** 
(0.0006) 
0.8031** 
(0.1718) 
0.0001 
0.11452 
0.91532 
748 
29 
Germany 
-0.1924 
(0.1603) 
-0.0131** 
(0.0024) 
1.1375** 
(0.1925) 
2.876 
0.47932 
0.84112 
833 
34 
France 
0.3530** 
(0.0696) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0006) 
9.5081* 
0.9324 
0.1 1452 
567 
23 
Italy 
-1.3109** 
(0.1281) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
1.3267** 
(0.1986) 
0.544 
0.14012 
0.58552 
305 
9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
V.2. Entry and Market Shares of Generics 
Now, we turn to the role of patterns of entry and of generic penetration. 
First, we regress the number of producers of multi-source drugs on the fo
llowing independent variables (we consider only the molecules where there are 
multi- source products) : 
• MKGR: market growth ; 
• RATIO: ratio of the average price of multi-source drugs to the average 
price of original products ; 
• MKTSZ: relative market size, calculated as the ratio between the total sales 
of a molecule and the total sales of all products in the sample ; 
TIMEA: number of quarters following the date of patent expiry. 
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Table 9 - Dependent Variable 
MKTGR 
RATIO 
MKTSZ 
TIMEA 
Constant 
Hausmann Test 
R2 or s2 
s2 or Sq 
n. observations 
n. molecules 
USA 
-0.0004 
(0.0011) 
0.2411** 
(0.0294) 
0.0063 
(0.0063) 
0.0302** 
(0.0024) 
12.8316* 
0.7433 
0.54312 
588 
23 
: Number of producers of multi-source drugs 
UK 
-0.0020 
(0.0047) 
0.4859 
(0.2725) 
0.3795** 
(0.0340) 
0.0943** 
(0.0053) 
25.4752** 
0.7712 
1.35762 
655 
25 
Germany 
0.0035 
(0.0079) 
-0.9602* 
(0.4370) 
-0.9279 
(0.4842) 
0.3807** 
(0.0139) 
86.0922** 
0.8948 
2.90362 
652 
26 
France 
0.0013 
(0.0028) 
0.0894 
(0.0525) 
-0.0522 
(0.0898) 
0.1019** 
(0.0076) 
21.5972** 
0.5886 
1.35332 
461 
21 
Italy 
-0.0067* 
(0.0031) 
0.5456* 
(0.2312) 
1.6323* 
(0.6743) 
-0.0331** 
(0.0076) 
4.6249* 
(1.929) 
0.1554 
1.17132 
5.83382 
259 
9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
Table 9 shows that the coefficient of the variable TIMEA is significant in all 
countries and positive everywhere except Italy : the number of producers of 
multi-source drugs grows over time in all countries, but it actually declines in 
Italy. The rate of growth of the market does not seem to be related to the entry 
of multi- source producers - with the exception of Italy, but with a negative 
sign - and market size induces entry only in the UK and in Italy. Interestingly, 
entry appears to be affected by price differentials (the variable RATIO) only in 
the US and Italy, with a positive sign, and in Germany with a negative sign. 
This result is quite interesting. It tells that in the US and Italy entry is higher 
in those products where multi-source products can charge relatively higher 
prices as compared to those of originals, but the opposite happens in Germany. 
In the other countries price differentials do not seem to matter much. 
Let us look now at the market share of generics. Table 10 reports the results 
for the regression of the market shares of each multi-source product (i.e. here 
the regressions are taken at the level of each single product, not of each single 
molecule) on the same independent variables of the previous equation, i.e : 
• MKTSZ : relative market size, calculated as the ratio between the total 
sales of a molecule and the total sales of all products in the sample ; 
• MKGR : market growth in terms of sales ; 
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Table 10 - Dependent Variable : Market share of multi-source products 
MKTSZ 
MKGR 
RATIO 
TIMEA 
Constant 
Hausmann Test 
R2 or s2 
s2 or s^ 
n. observations 
n. products 
n. molecules 
USA 
-0.0500 
(0.1402) 
-0.0792** 
(0.0125) 
0.2421 
(0.2141) 
0.4788** 
(0.0249) 
19.707** 
0.9057 
6.61092 
1072 
53 
22 
UK 
-0.3694 
(0.2230) 
0.0001 
(0.0070) 
1.0173** 
(0.3224) 
0.2243** 
(0.0103) 
27.350** 
0.9226 
3.721P 
2177 
129 
25 
Germany 
-2.6716** 
(0.5378) 
0.0037* 
(0.0018) 
0.3462** 
(0.1104) 
0.0746** 
(0.0037) 
37.785** 
0.8962 
2.21782 
6721 
353 
25 
France 
0.3520 
(0.6252) 
0.0106** 
(0.0035) 
0.0300 
(0.0750) 
0.1254** 
(0.0122) 
269.14** 
0.8673 
2.62752 
1141 
104 
21 
Italy 
-2.9636 
(3.174) 
0.0108** 
(0.0032) 
0.5732** 
(0.2212) 
0.0123 
(0.0092) 
45.451** 
0.6863 
2.97362 
1288 
58 
9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
• RATIO : ratio of the price of multi-source drugs to the average price of ori
ginal products; 
• TIMEA : quarters since patent expiry. 
The size of the market (MKTSZ) is significant only in Germany, but with a 
negative sign. That is to say, market size per se does not induce larger market 
shares for multi-source products. If anything, generics have larger market 
shares in niche markets in Germany. Fast growing markets are associated with 
larger market shares of generics in Germany, France and Italy and negatively 
so in the US. 
The variable RATIO, i.e. the ratio of the price of multi-source drugs to the 
average price of original products is insignificant in the US and France but it 
is significantly and positively related to market shares of generics in the UK, 
Germany and Italy. 
Finally, the coefficient of the variable TIMEA is positive and significant in 
all countries, i.e. the market share of multi-source drugs tend to grow over time 
everywhere, once again except Italy, where this share does not significantly 
change. This result confirms that generic entry builds up over time rather than 
following immediately patent expiry. Again, this observation is consistent with 
REVUE D'ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°99, 2ème trimestre 2002 125 
the point made by Hudson that effective patent protection extends beyond 
patent life and that different institutional regimes induce different effect on 
firms behavior before and after patent expiry. 
In conclusion, let us examine the difference between the average price of 
Original products and the average price of multi- source drugs (DIFF). The 
independent variables included in the regression are : 
• HHI: the Herfindahl Index; 
• MKGRD: market growth in terms of quantities (number of DDDs); 
• MKTSZD: market size in terms of quantities (number of DDDs); 
• TIMEA: time elapsed since patent expiry. 
The difference between the prices increases over time in the US, UK and 
France, while it decreases in Germany, consistently with the descriptive evi
dence (Table 11). The coefficient of the variable TIMEA is not significant in 
Italy. Market growth (MKGRD) and market size (MKSZD) are not significant 
in all countries, whereas market concentration (HHI) has a positive effect on 
price differentials in the UK and a negative effect in the US. 
Table 11 - Dependent Variable : Difference between the average price 
of Original products and the average price of multi-source drugs 
HHI 
MKTGRD 
MKTSZD 
TIME 
Constant 
Hausmann Test 
R2 or si 
s2 or s2a 
n. observations 
n. molecules 
USA 
-0.6299** 
(0.1763) 
0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0020 
(0.0044) 
0.0217** 
(0.0019) 
0.8331** 
(0.2473) 
4.0707 
0.39462 
1.16262 
588 
23 
UK 
0.3265** 
(0.0678) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0034) 
0.0023** 
(0.0007) 
-0.1265 
(0.0779) 
0.0001 
O.13322 
0.31612 
655 
25 
Germany 
-0.0989 
(0.1237) 
0.0002 
(0.0010) 
0.0106 
(0.0181) 
-0.0046* 
(0.0020) 
0.3363** 
(0.1229) 
4.0426 
0.37022 
0.40052 
652 
26 
France 
-0.1803 
(0.1004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0038 
(0.0036) 
0.0024** 
(0.0008) 
9.7698** 
0.5079 
0.11982 
461 
21 
Italy 
-0.0171 
(0.0999) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0129 
(0.0160) 
-0.00002 
(0..0005) 
-0.0439 
(0.0766) 
0.0001 
0.08072 
0.1 7002 
259 
9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
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V.3. Patterns of Competition 
Summing up, we observe quite distinct patterns of competition across count
ries. In this section we do focus on two extreme cases: France and the US. 
In the US, we observe a positive time trend for the price of originals and a 
negative one for the prices of generics. Patent expiry slows down the trend 
towards higher prices of original products over time. Similarly, multi-source 
drugs tend to limit their price growth at the time of patent expiry and in each 
following quarter. Conversely, the prices of generics tend to fall continuously 
over time. Market concentration does not affect the prices of original products: 
presumably, patent protection confers strong exclusivity power. 
Concentration, however, increases the prices of generics. Thus, price different
ial between the average price of respectively original products and generics 
grows over time and it is lower in highly concentrated markets. The number of 
producers and the market share of generics grow over time and they are not 
affected by market size or market growth. If anything, the share of generics 
appears to be lower in fast growing markets. Entry, but not markets shares, is 
higher when multi-source drugs can earn higher prices relatively to originals. 
In France (and in Italy) both the prices of originals and generics fall over 
time. In both countries, this tendency weakens after patent expiry (in Italy the 
price of original products actually increases after patent expiry) and in relation 
to generic penetration. Concentration reduces prices in Italy, while it increases 
the price of generics in France. The number of generic producers increases 
over time in France, while it decreases in Italy: here, entry is stronger in large, 
slow-growing markets, where generics keep high relative prices as compared 
to originals. As mentioned previously, in these countries imitative products 
have tended to enter the market before patent expiry largely through co-mark
eting agreements, in the attempt to obtain higher prices from the regulators. 
VI. - CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The results of this paper can be summarized under three main headings: a) 
descriptive analysis of the dynamics of drug prices and penetration of gener
ics; b) effects of patent expiry and generic competition over drug prices at the 
level of specific chemical entities; c) determinants of the diffusion of multi- 
source products. 
First, in general, this paper has shown that the relationships between the 
dynamics of drug prices, patent expiry and competition by multi-source drugs 
are quite complex and that they vary significantly across countries. 
A clear distinction seems to emerge from our empirical investigation. On the 
one side, systems that rely on market based competition in pharmaceuticals 
(particularly the US) promote a clear distinction between firms that act as 
innovators and firms that act as imitators after patent expiry. To put it in a nut- 
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shell, Original products can enjoy premium prices and exclusivity profits 
under patent protection, then facing fierce price competition after patent expir
y. On the contrary, systems that rely on administered prices (France and Italy) 
nurture strategies of pre-emptive brand proliferation and horizontal differen
tiation by imitative brand name products well before patent expiry (Italy being 
an extreme case). 
The US display many of the textbook features of a market characterized first 
by strong patent protection and then by competition by generics (8). Multi- 
source drugs start to enter the market at the time of patent expiry at substant
ially lower prices than original drugs and they gradually and consistently gain 
market shares over time. All in all, in the US the patterns of competition gene
rate a sharp distinction between « innovators » and « imitators ». Yet, innovat
ors defend themselves from competition not so much by reducing prices, but 
also (and perhaps mainly) by succeeding in segmenting the market and making 
demand inelastic. Price increases generate higher profits because the revenue 
gains from them offset the revenue loss associated with lower levels of 
demand. Thus, even if some breakthrough products and companies do not sup
port their original products in competition with the «specialized» generic 
houses, on the whole average drug prices for branded products tend to remain 
stable or even increase over time. 
At the opposite extreme of the US, in France and Italy the prices of both ori
ginals and generics tend to fall over time, well before patent expiry. Moreover, 
multi-source drugs (mainly Other Brands) enter the market before patent expir
y, at prices higher than the (falling) prices of Original products largely 
through co-marketing agreements in the attempt to obtain higher prices from 
the regulators. The diffusion of generics is quite small, however, even in the 
long run and especially in Italy. Over time, the prices of multi-source drugs 
decline in France and remain stable in Italy, while the decrease in the prices of 
Original products stops. As a consequence, the average price remains stable 
after (is not affected by) patent expiry. 
At another extreme (with the UK and Germany falling between the two), in 
France (and Italy), patents do not appear to work very effectively, neither in 
conferring strong advantages and incentives to innovators, nor in curbing prices 
(8) These dynamics are reflective of the substantial increase in the competitive forces at work 
in the US pharmaceutical and health care industries, in relation to the diffusion of organi
zations such as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
(PBMs), and mechanisms such as maximum allowable costs (MAC), documentation of 
therapeutic equivalence, cost sharing mechanisms, mandatory generic substitution for 
brand name written prescriptions or, in some cases, even therapeutic substitution. These 
organizations and mechanisms and, to a different extent, the fixation of upper payment 
limits for multi-source drug products by Federal Medicaid, have promoted price competit
ion after patent expiry and the use of generic products in the US. Pressures towards price 
competition notwithstanding, producers of original drugs are sometimes able to maintain, 
and even increase, their prices after patent expiry. 
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after expiry. Rather, firms are induced to introduce small variations on the ori
ginal products, enjoying relatively higher prices, while strategic alliances, espe
cially in the form of comarketing and licensing agreements, are effective in kee
ping branded products from competition with generic medicines. 
The second set of results refer to the impact of patent expiry, generic comp
etition, and market concentration on drug prices. The paper shows that as 
such patent expiry does not impact directly on price dynamics. At the most, it 
slows down price changes, with the only exception of Germany. Generic comp
etition effectively tends to reduce the price of original products only in the 
US, but has the opposite effect in Italy and France. Finally, market concentrat
ion has a different impact on the price of respectively original and multi-sour
ce drugs. Concentration, measured at the level of single molecules is actually 
associated with higher prices of original products in the UK, Germany and 
France, but with lower prices in Italy and is irrelevant in the US. Conversely, 
it induces higher prices of multi-source drugs in the US and France and again 
lower prices in Italy, while it is non significant in Germany and the UK. These 
results broadly corroborate views according to which the effective patent life 
of a product goes beyond patent expiry (see Hudson, 2000). 
Third, our results show that while generic competition has tended to grow 
over time in all countries (with the remarkable exception of Italy), this pattern 
is sustained by different factors/variables in different countries. This suggests 
that the diffusion of generics is strongly affected by the specific features of 
national systems of regulation. In particular, other components bear a strong 
relevance, such as the overall level of pharmaceutical prices in a country, doc
tors having direct access to PC based comparative price data for medicines, 
generic substitution permitted in the country, and the existence of effective 
patient co-payments (for example, in France copayment is co-insured). 
Prominent among them are certainly the extent and the forms of regulation. 
The diffusion of generics and their impact on drug prices is certainly lower 
in France and Italy, where prices are regulated than in the US and Germany, 
where prices are high and are much less regulated. Price regulation may redu
ce both the incentives and the possibilities to generic competition, both by kee
ping the prices of original products low and by not imposing strong incentives 
to patients and physicians to not use more expensive branded drugs. However, 
even in Germany, as well as in the other European countries considered in this 
paper, generics are mainly Other Branded products, which are launched at 
relatively high prices, and whose diffusion is sustained by marketing strategies 
different from price competition. Finally, even in the US, where the penetra
tion of generics is quite strong, their competitive pressure on prices is com
pensated by increases in the prices of branded drugs. At the level of each single 
molecule, this strategy lessen generic competition, accommodating entry. At 
the firm level, this might reflect multiproduct market power enhancing strate
gies, in which the pioneer firm uses price increases of the original drug to 
boost the demand of a new substitute, expanding its market size. 
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Thus, factors other than the market institutional framework are certainly 
important. Different countries have different medical traditions, different ins
titutional settings for financing and provision of health care, and different 
absolute size. This latter variable, in particular, is likely to exert a significant 
effect in determining the extent and impact of generic competition, particular
ly at the sub market level (see also Hudson, 2000 and NERA, 1998). 
As for the effect of the analyzed phenomena on innovativeness and welfare, 
our work confirms that systems that rely on administered prices tend to stifle 
price competition, to protect less efficient companies, and to encourage strate
gies aiming at introducing incremental variations of existing products (see 
Thomas, 1996; Gambardella, Orsenigo, and Pammolli, 2000). 
Irrespectively of any comparison with the US market, these findings seem to 
be relevant in terms of policy implications for European Countries. 
First, European national healthcare systems are still highly diversified in 
terms of the way they are organized and financed, ranging from national heal
th schemes funded out of general taxes (the UK-Italy-Spain model), to man
dated personal insurance with pluralist providers (the Germany-France- 
Netherlands model). While these variations reflect different social values, 
ethics, and levels of wealth across Europe, they might contribute to generate 
inconsistencies, inefficient uses of resources, uneven standards of medical 
care, and distortions in the functioning of markets. Moreover, they constitute 
an impediment to the creation of a unified European market, with all its 
implied consequences in terms of size of the market, economies of scale, and 
higher competition. 
Second, as for industrial policy and competitiveness issues, an increased 
market competition in the off-patent segment of the market can contribute to 
foster efficiency and to design adequate incentives to innovate within the 
European environment, promoting patterns of industrial reorganization and 
selection and, moreover, allowing higher prices and returns on investment for 
innovative products that are still on patent. 
(Voir références page suivante) 
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